Security Testing

31 - C1
  The security mechanisms of the ADP system shall be tested and found to work as claimed in the system documentation. Testing shall be done to assure that there are no obvious ways for an unauthorized user to bypass or otherwise defeat the security protection mechanisms of the TCB. (See the Security Testing guidelines.)

32 - C2
  Testing shall also include a search for obvious flaws that would allow violation of resource isolation, or that would permit unauthorized access to the audit or authentication data. (See the Security Testing guidelines.)

33 - B1
  Modified.
  A team of individuals who thoroughly understand the specific implementation of the TCB shall subject its design documentation, source code, and object code to thorough analysis and testing. Their objectives shall be: to uncover all design and implementation flaws that would permit a subject external to the TCB to read, change, or delete data normally denied under the mandatory or discretionary security policy enforced by the TCB; as well as to assure that no subject (without authorization to do so) is able to cause the TCB to enter a state such that it is unable to respond to communications initiated by other users. All discovered flaws shall be removed or neutralized and the TCB retested to demonstrate that they have been eliminated and that new flaws have not been introduced. (See the Security Testing Guidelines.)

34 - B2
  The TCB shall be found relatively resistant to penetration.

  Modified.
  All discovered flaws shall be corrected and the TCB retested to demonstrate that they have been eliminated and that new flaws have not been introduced.

  Testing shall demonstrate that the TCB implementation is consistent with the descriptive top-level specification. (See the Security Testing Guidelines.)

35 - B3
  Modified.
  The TCB shall be found resistant to penetration.

  No design flaws and no more than a few correctable implementation flaws may be found during testing and there shall be reasonable confidence that few remain.

36 - A1
  Manual or other mapping of the FTLS to the source code may form a basis for penetration testing.

Design Specification and Verification

37 B1
  An informal or formal model of the security policy supported by the TCB shall be maintained over the life cycle of the ADP system and demonstrated to be consistent with its axioms.

38 B2
  Modified.
  A formal model of the security policy supported by the TCB shall be maintained over the life cycle of the ADP system that is proven consistent with its axioms. A descriptive top-level specification (DTLS) of the TCB shall be maintained that completely and accurately describes the TCB in terms of exceptions, error messages, and effects. It shall be shown to be an accurate description of the TCB interface.

39 B3
  A convincing argument shall be given that the DTLS is consistent with the model.

40 A1
  Modified.
  A formal top-level specification (FTLS) of the TCB shall be maintained that accurately describes the TCB in terms of exceptions, error messages, and effects. The DTLS and FTLS shall include those components of the TCB that are implemented as hardware and/or firmware if their properties are visible at the TCB interface. The FTLS shall be shown to be an accurate description of the TCB interface. A convincing argument shall be given that the DTLS is consistent with the model and a combination of formal and informal techniques shall be used to show that FTLS is consistent with the model. This verification evidence shall be consistent with that provided within the state-of-the-art of the particular National Computer Security Center-endorsed formal specification and verification system used. Manual or other mapping of the FTLS to the TCB source code shall be performed to provide evidence of correct implementation.

Covert Channel Analysis

41 B2
  The system developer shall conduct a thorough search for covert storage channels and make a determination (either by actual measurement or by engineering estimation) of the maximum bandwidth of each identified channel. (See the Covert Channels Guideline section.)

42 B3
  Modified.
  The system developer shall conduct a thorough search for covert channels and make a determination (either by actual measurement or by engineering estimation) of the maximum bandwidth of each identified channel. (See the Covert Channels Guideline section.)

43 A1
  Formal methods shall be used in the analysis.

Trusted Facility Management

44 B2
  The TCB shall support separate operator and administrator functions.

45 B3, A1
  The functions performed in the role of a security administrator shall be identified. The ADP system administrative personnel shall only be able to perform security administrator functions after taking a distinct auditable action to assume the security administrator role on the ADP system. Non-security functions that can be performed in the security administration role shall be limited strictly to those essential to performing the security role effectively.

Configuration Management

46 B2, B3
  During development and maintenance of the TCB, a configuration management system shall be in place that maintains control of changes to the descriptive top-level specification, other design data, implementation documentation, source code, the running version of the object code, and test fixtures and documentation. The configuration management system shall assure a consistent mapping among all documentation and code associated with the current version of the TCB. Tools shall be provided for generation of a new version of the TCB from source code. Also available shall be tools for comparing a newly generated version with the previous TCB version in order to ascertain that only the intended changes have been made in the code that will actually be used as the new version of the TCB.

47 A1
  Modified.
  During the entire life-cycle, i.e., during the design, development, and maintenance of the TCB, a configuration management system shall be in place for all security-relevant hardware, firmware, and software that maintains control of changes to the formal model, the descriptive and formal top-level specifications, other design data, implementation documentation, source code, the running version of the object code, and test fixtures and documentation.

  Modified.
  Also available shall be tools, maintained under strict configuration control, for comparing a newly generated version with the previous TCB version in order to ascertain that only the intended changes have been made in the code that will actually be used as the new version of the TCB.

  A combination of technical, physical, and procedural safeguards shall be used to protect from unauthorized modification or destruction the master copy or copies of all material used to generate the TCB.

Trusted Recovery

48 B3, A1
  Procedures and/or mechanisms shall be provided to assure that, after an ADP system failure or other discontinuity, recovery without a protection compromise is obtained.

Trusted Distribution

49 A1
  A trusted ADP system control and distribution facility shall be provided for maintaining the integrity of the mapping between the master data describing the current version of the TCB and the on-site master copy of the code for the current version. Procedures (e.g., site security acceptance testing) shall exist for assuring that the TCB software, firmware, and hardware updates distributed to a customer are exactly as specified by the master copies.

Security Features User's Guide

50 C1, C2, B1, B2, B3, A1
  A single summary, chapter, or manual in user documentation shall describe the protection mechanisms provided by the TCB, guidelines on their use, and how they interact with one another.

Trusted Facility Manual

51 C1
  A manual addressed to the ADP system administrator shall present cautions about functions and privileges that should be controlled when running a secure facility.

52 C2
  The procedures for examining and maintaining the audit files as well as the detailed audit record structure for each type of audit event shall be given.

53 B1
  The manual shall describe the operator and administrator functions related to security, to include changing the security characteristics of a user. It shall provide guidelines on the consistent and effective use of the protection features of the system, how they interact, how to securely generate a new TCB, and facility procedures, warnings, and privileges that need to be controlled in order to operate the facility in a secure manner.

54 B2
  The TCB modules that contain the reference validation mechanism shall be identified. The procedures for secure generation of a new TCB from source after modification of any modules in the TCB shall be described.

55 B3, A1
  It shall include the procedures to ensure that the system is initially started in a secure manner. Procedures shall also be included to resume secure system operation after any lapse in system operation.

Test Documentation

56 C1, C2, B1
  The system developer shall provide to the evaluators a document that describes the test plan, test procedures that show how the security mechanisms were tested, and results of the security mechanisms' functional testing.

57 B2, B3
  It shall include results of testing the effectiveness of the methods used to reduce covert channel bandwidths.

58 A1
  The results of the mapping between the formal top-level specification and the TCB source code shall be given.

Design Documentation

59 C1, C2
  Documentation shall be available that provides a description of the manufacturer's philosophy of protection and an explanation of how this philosophy is translated into the TCB. If the TCB is composed of distinct modules, the interfaces between these modules shall be described.

60 B1
  An informal or formal description of the security policy model enforced by the TCB shall be available and an explanation provided to show that it is sufficient to enforce the security policy. The specific TCB protection mechanisms shall be identified and an explanation given to show that they satisfy the model.

61 B2
  Modified.
  The interfaces between the TCB modules shall be described. A formal description of the security policy model enforced by the TCB shall be available and proven that it is sufficient to enforce the security policy.

  The descriptive top-level specification (DTLS) shall be shown to be an accurate description of the TCB interface. Documentation shall describe how the TCB implements the reference monitor concept and give an explanation why it is tamper resistant, cannot be bypassed, and is correctly implemented. Documentation shall describe how the TCB is structured to facilitate testing and to enforce least privilege. This documentation shall also present the results of the covert channel analysis and the tradeoffs involved in restricting the channels. All auditable events that may be used in the exploitation of known covert storage channels shall be identified. The bandwidths of known covert storage channels, the use of which is not detectable by the auditing mechanisms, shall be provided. (See the Covert Channel Guideline section.)

62 B3
  The TCB implementation (i.e., in hardware, firmware, and software) shall be informally shown to be consistent with the DTLS. The elements of the DTLS shall be shown, using informal techniques, to correspond to the elements of the TCB.

63 A1
  Modified.
  The TCB implementation (i.e., in hardware, firmware, and software) shall be informally shown to be consistent with the formal top-level specification (FTLS). The elements of the FTLS shall be shown, using informal techniques, to correspond to the elements of the TCB.

  Hardware, firmware, and software mechanisms not dealt with in the FTLS but strictly internal to the TCB (e.g., mapping registers, direct memory access I/O) shall be clearly described.